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STATE MARKET POWER AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION: A STATE'S RIGHT TO EXCLUDE
GARBAGE IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE
CHARLES T. DuMARS*

I.

INTRODUCTION

There is no doubt that the engines of production in the United States
have generated great wealth. This wealth includes a gross domestic product
in dollar amounts not previously imagined, as well as a standard of living
supported by an apparently unlimited supply of tangible luxuries. Ours
is a society of disposable everything, from diapers to lighters to telephones.
Plastics abound and provide an apparently low cost alternative to the
use of glass and paper. The low cost of plastics is only "apparent"
because the true costs of utilization of these non-recyclable substances
are just beginning to be understood. Space for disposal of solid wastes
was previously considered limitless and available at no cost. Space for
landfills, like clean air, was believed to be a widely available and inexpensive commodity. We now realize that the price of clean air is high.
Costs include scrubbers that are placed on coal fired power plants, catalytic
converters on automobiles, and ethanol fuels. All of these costs are passed
on to consumers. Likewise, as the finite nature of landfill space is being
realized, the cost of this scarcity will be felt in the price of disposable
goods.
Until the science fiction perpetual motion machine is developed, a byproduct of all production will be waste matter. For example, when a
factory produces a styrofoam cup, at least two waste disposal costs are
incurred. First, there is the cost of disposing of the wastes from the
factory, such as unused materials, refuse, and industrial solid and liquid
wastes. Second, there is the cost of disposing of the cup after someone
has used it.
Obviously, in a private economic system, the goal of the industry
producing the cup is to produce the best product at the least cost.
Industry will therefore seek to dispose of its wastes using the least costly
alternative. It will only reduce the quantity of waste it produces if it is
cheaper to reduce waste than to dispose of it. Similarly, it will only
incinerate the waste it produces, rather than dispose of it in a landfill,
if doing so makes economic sense. Members of the society at large
respond to these same economic signals. They will only cease to use the
styrofoam cup when it is cheaper to use paper than to pay the cost of
utilizing styrofoam. If styrofoam cups are cheap and can simply be taken
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to the landfill at low cost, the consumer will continue to buy these cups.
In general, landfill space becomes expensive only when the fill itself
becomes visible and noxious to the private rights of others or otherwise
pollutes the environment. This aversion to visibility is often first reflected
in the "not in my backyard" syndrome in the state where the industry
is located. The most economic solution is often simply to transport the
waste to an area that is not someone's backyard, where the consequences
of disposal are not visible, and where no one entity or group of entities
is directly affected. The best example of this solution is ocean disposal.
The ocean does not belong to any one person, and the effects of disposal
are generally not visible. Today, however, it is more accurate to say that
the results of ocean disposal have not been visible in the past. The effects
of ocean disposal are becoming very visible as wastes wash up on the
backyard beaches of eastern seaboard states.
If ocean disposal is not a viable option, the next best alternative is
to move the wastes to an area of low population at a great distance
from the regional population centers that generate the waste. Under this
scenario, the wastes are not visible and are not in anyone's backyard,
or if they are in someone's backyard, that person has such a big yard
he does not mind. Using this option, a producing state may provide an
excellent quality of life, made possible by the high tax revenues generated
by the waste producing industry, while exporting the industrial garbage
to a low population state miles away.
If garbage export costs are cheap and the costs of producing the
products is low, consumers will continue to purchase the products. What
occurs, in effect, is a trade-off of landfill space in low population states
for low cost products throughout the country. The big winner is, of
course, the garbage exporting state because it gets both an industrial tax
base and low cost products. The loser may be the garbage receiving state
because it takes the garbage as a quid pro quo for low priced goods,
and, in effect, subsidizes the balance of the union by accepting out-ofstate garbage.
This article explores the commerce clause implications raised if a less
populated state refuses to accept out-of-state garbage at a state-owned
landfill. The following hypothetical illustrates the issue.
State R (the receiving state), pursuant to legislative mandate, passes a
law which provides that state tax monies raised by the tourist industry
will be used to construct a state landfill, which will be of the highest
quality in terms of environmental protection. The state also allows any
private hauler to come to the landfill if he brings garbage from within
the state. The prices for dumping are subsidized by tax revenues. The
landfill is constructed through bids issued to the private sector and is
operated under contract by a private firm. The landfill is, however, owned
by State R. All other private landfills are ordered closed, are purchased
by the state through condemnation proceedings, and are operated by the
state in a similar manner. In addition, the State R legislature passes a
bill outlawing the sale of styrofoam and disposable kitchenware and
requires recycling of all beverage cans and bottles. A private garbage
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hauler from State E arrives at the state-owned landfill and demands to
dump his industrial wastes from a styrofoam manufacturing plant in
State E, as well as municipal wastes from State E containing styrofoam
products, disposable glass bottles, and cans.
The question addressed in this article is whether the "state market
participant exception" to the dormant commerce clause permits State R
to deny access to the out-of-state solid waste producer described in this
hypothetical. The author's answer is yes, State R can exclude these wastes.
State R (receiving state) has elected to recycle, to restrict the amount of
waste it generates, and to provide a high level of environmental protection
by owning and subsidizing its waste disposal industry. There is no categorical market imperative either in the commerce clause or in fundamental
economic theory that allows State E garbage producers to undercut State
R environmental policies by exporting domestic styrofoam, glass, and
industrial wastes from State E to State R. The choices are clear for State
E. If State E garbage producers cannot export to State R, they will be
forced to look elsewhere or internalize the costs of their own waste
production. The implications for State R, if it is forced to receive the
wastes, are also clear. If State R cannot refuse the waste, it will have
no motivation either to recycle or to provide expensive environmental
protection measures. The balance of interests tips in favor of State R.
Supreme Court caselaw is consistent with this result.
This article does not discuss challenges under the privileges and immunities clause' or the equal protection clause' as these are explored well
3
elsewhere. Nor does it discuss federal preemption. Rather, it explores
only whether the dormant commerce clause rationale of maintaining a
free economic interstate market is sufficiently powerful to deny a state

1. An excellent discussion of the role of the privileges and immunities clause and the market
participant doctrine can be found in Rodgers, The Limits of State Activity in the Interstate Water
Market, XXI LAND & WATER LAW REV. 357 (1986). The privilege and immunities clause is very
unlikely to come into play in these cases because the clause relates to the rights of human citizens
to live and work in a state with the same rights as others. It is unlikely that a privilege of United
States citizenship includes the right to operate a dump that accepts garbage from another state. It
is the "residence" of the garbage, not the "residence" of the business owner, that precludes the
operation of the dump.
2. See discussion of equal protection in Rodgers, supra note 1. Absent discrimination against
a suspect class of individuals or in violation of a fundamental right, the standard for equal protection
review is whether the discrimination is rational and whether the classification substantially furthers
the asserted state objective. See generally Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). In
the author's view, there is no fundamental right to produce garbage and move it interstate other
than may exist under the commerce clause. If the commerce clause is the basis for the right, then
the market participant doctrine is invoked and the equal protection analysis is no longer relevant.
In addition, the desire on the part of the state refusing to accept the garbage to reduce waste and
to protect the state's environment is clearly rational, and most legislation of the type discussed
would accomplish this result.
3. In the author's view, there is a significant difference between disposal of hazardous or
radioactive wastes and disposal of normal industrial or municipal wastes. The former are extensively
federally regulated, and it is not suggested that the arguments made here with respect to industrial
and municipal wastes are applicable to hazardous or radioactive wastes. For a good discussion of
preemption, see Rodgers, supra note 1; Campbell, State Ownership of Hazardous Waste Disposal
Sites: A Technique for Excluding Out-of-State Waste?, 14 ENVTL. L. 177, 191 (1983).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

the right to operate a landfill exclusively
for the industrial and municipal
4
wastes generated by its residents .
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution enumerates the
powers of Congress, one of which is the power "to regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes." 5 The explicit congressional power "to regulate Commerce ...
among the several States . . . ," together with the negative implication
that states may not invade that province,6 sparks the debate in commerce
clause disputes. The debate always requires a resolution that inherently
affects the balance between state and federal power. Indeed, the history
of commerce clause adjudication is a history of the search for the balance
of federal-state power that best serves the society's needs at a particular
time while recognizing that those needs continually change and become
increasingly complex. The historical origin of the clause itself provides
only a small piece of the information necessary to understand how the
clause applies to the complex political and economic disputes that characterize the modern cases. Any attempt to suggest possible outcomes in
commerce clause challenges, however, must necessarily begin with a review
of the provision's origins.
The foremost problem of the federal union under the Articles of
Confederation may have been its inability to tax. 7 The failure of the
Confederation may also be attributed, however, to the absence of national
regulatory power over commerce and to the resulting commercial "interstate brawls." 8 Trade barriers and acts of economic retribution among
the states became so prevalent that in 1786 the Virginia Assembly felt

4. The best discussion of the market participant doctrine is contained in Coenen, Untangling
the Market-ParticipantExemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MIcH. L. REv. 395 (1989).
It should be compared with Kovacs & Anderson, States as Market Participants in Solid Waste
Disposal Service-Fair Competition or the Destruction of the Private Sector, 18 ENVTL. L. 779
(1988). Another author has also explored this question thoroughly and thoughtfully. See Pomper,
Recycling Philadelphia v. New Jersey: The Dormant Commerce Clause, Post Industrial Natural
Responses, and the Solid Waste Crisis, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1309 (1989).
5. U.S. CON.ST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. In a case of first impression, the Tenth Circuit recently held
that the commerce clause limits the taxing powers of Indian tribes, as well as those of the states,
and that "the standard to be used in applying [the Indian commerce] clause is whether a tribe's
tax legislation infringes upon the national interest in maintaining the free flow of interstate trade
• . . measured by [the] traditional analyses." Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537, 545
(10th Cir.), cert. granted, 449 U.S. 820 (1980), aff'd, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). For a discussion of the
Indian commerce clause, see Kovnat, Solid Waste Regulation in Indian Country, 21 N.M.L. REV.
121 (1990).
6. See generally L. TRIBE, AmmcAN CoNsnrruToNA LAW § 6-2 (1978).
7. A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, TIE AmnmcAN CONsTrruTION: ITS OUons AND DEVELOPMENT
108 (3d ed. 1963); S. MORISON, THE OxFoRD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 304 (1965).
8. "There were enough interstate brawls to cause great disquiet. The New York assembly in
1787 assessed heavy entrance and clearance fees on all vessels coming from or bound to New Jersey
and Connecticut; New Jersey retaliated by taxing the lighthouse on Sandy Hook $30 a month."
S. MoRIsoN, supra note 7, at 304. See generally Sholley, The Negative Implication of the Commerce
Clause, 3 U. Cm. L. Rv. 556 (1936); Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy,
1933-1946, 59 HARv. L. Rav. 645 (1946).
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compelled to propose what became the Annapolis Convention "to take
into consideration the trade of the United States [and] to consider how
far a uniform system in their commercial regulation may be necessary
to their common interest and their permanent harmony." 9 Although only
five states sent representatives and nothing substantive resulted, the report
of the Annapolis Convention was one catalyst for the Constitutional
Convention of 1787.10 The records of the Constitutional Convention,"
the Federalist Papers, 12 and the histories of the period 3 all indicate that
the framers of the Constitution sought to overcome interstate rivalries
and parochial protection of local economic interests. It is this purpose
that modern Supreme Court opinions continue to describe as the original
intent of the commerce clause. 4
If the framers clearly intended to free national commerce from the
strictures of state protectionism when they gave Congress the power "[tfo
it is curious
regulate Commerce . .. among the several States . .,.-"

9. Resolution of the General Assembly of Virginia, Proposing a Joint Meeting of Commissioners
from the States to Consider and Recommend a Federal Plan for Regulating Commerce (Jan. 21,
1786), reprinted in GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, DoCUMNrs ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF
THE UNION OF TIlE AmERIcAN STATES 38 (1927) [hereinafter DocuENrs].
10. It was . . . to secure freedom of trade, to break down the barriers to its free flow,
that the Annapolis Convention was called, only to adjourn with a view to Philadelphia. Thus the generating source of the Constitution lay in the rising volume
of restraints upon commerce which the Confederation could not check. These were
the proximate cause of our national existence down to today.
W. RUTLEDGE, A DECLARATION OF LEGAL FAITH 25 (1947).
While the Annapolis Convention was primarily concerned with removing barriers to commerce,
the participants clearly recognized that this problem was linked with other aspects of the federal
system.
In .this persuasion, your Commissioners submit an opinion, that the Idea of
extending the powers of their Deputies, to other objects, than those of Commerce,
which has been adopted by the State of New Jersey, was an improvement on the
original plan, and will deserve to be incorporated into that of a future Convention;
they are the more naturally led to this conclusion, as in the course of their reflections
on the subject, they have been induced to think, that the power of regulating trade
is of such comprehensive extent, and will enter so far into the general System of
the foederal [sic] government, that to give it efficacy, and to obviate questions and
doubts concerning its precise nature and limits, may require a correspondent adjustment of other parts of the Federal System.
Proceedings of the Commissioners to Remedy Defects of the Federal Government, Annapolis,
Maryland (Sept. 14, 1786), reprinted in DOCUMENTS, supra note 9, at 41-42.
11. 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONvErnoN OF 1787, at 308 (rev. ed. 1937);
3 id. at 478, 547-48. See generally S. PADOVER, To SECURE THESE BLESSINGs 215-19 (1962).
12. ThE FEDERALIST Nos. 7, 11-12 (A. Hamilton), 41-42 (J. Madison).
13. 1 G. CURTIS, HISTORY OF THE ORIGIN, FORMATION, AND ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 502 (1854); M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CoNsTrUTION OF TiE UNITED
STATES 5-10 (1913); 1 F. THORPE, TiE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 266-75
(1901).
14. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of
Md., 437 U.S. 117, 151 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Hughes
v. Alexandria Scrap.Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 807 (1976); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S.
511, 523 (1935).
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The purpose of the commerce clause is similar to that of
the import-export clause, which provides: "No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress,
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. The
lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports ....
import-export clause was intended, among other purposes, to prevent seaboard states from discrim-
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that they did not expressly address state interference with interstate
commerce. 16 The Convention, however, was pervaded by a fundamental
division between delegates who advocated a strong central government
and those committed to state sovereignty as the primary principle of the
union. 17 An attempt to fashion language on state interference with interstate commerce could easily have led to a breakup of the Convention.
The need to skirt that issue in order to reach consensus on the Constitution
as a whole 8 may be the best explanation why the Constitution does not
clearly delegate certain regulatory powers over commerce to the states
and certain powers to the Congress.' 9
The framers' inability to reach closure on this issue did not bother
Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden.20 In striking down a steamboat license monopoly granted by the New York legislature, the Chief
Justice found that the state charter conflicted with a federal coastal
licensing law. The federal licensing law was upheld as a valid exercise
of the commerce power. He concluded that the conflicting state license
violated the supremacy clause. 2' Marshall's decision established the foundation for the theory of the exclusivity of federal power over commerce: 22

inating against inland states by taxing overseas imports and exports. 3 M. FARJRAN,
supra note
11, at 328-29. See also Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976). This purpose of
nondiscrimination is common to both clauses.
16. It has been suggested that the framers may have believed that the privileges and immunities
clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, was a sufficient limitation on state parochialism. L. TRIE, supra
note 6, at § 6-2.
17. See generally A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, supra note 7, at 114-47.
18. As Alfred North Whitehead remarked: "The [framers] had an uncommonly clear grasp of
the general ideas that they wanted put in [the Constitution], then left the working out of the details
to later interpreters .... " THE DIA loGuEs OF ALFRED NORTH WmTEHEAD 204 (L. Price ed. 1954).
19. An early commerce clause scholar suggested that the framers knew they could not grasp all
the implications of the grant of the commerce power; therefore, they were unwilling to impose a
categorical limitation on state action, preferring to leave such limitations to a fair application of
the congressional power. F. RmBLE, STATE AND NATIONAL POWER OVER COMERCE 30 (1937).
Justice Jackson read the commerce clause silence as placing an affirmative duty on the Court to
promote the economic best interest of the country. "[Elven more than by interpretation of its
written word, this Court has advanced the solidarity and prosperity of this Nation by the meaning
it has given to these great silences of the Constitution." H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S.
525, 535 (1949). It is not clear, however, that the commerce clause must be read as embracing a
constitutionally compelled doctrine of national free trade. See infra note 22.
20. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
21. Id. at 221.
22. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion was not without ambiguity concerning whether the commerce
power was exclusively federal.
The acknowledged power of a State to regulate its police, its domestic trade, and
to govern its own citizens, may enable it to legislate on this subject, to a considerable
extent ....
Since, however, in exercising the power of regulating their own purely internal
affairs, whether of trading or police, the States may sometimes enact laws, the
validity of which depends on their interfering with, and being contrary to, an act
of Congress passed in pursuance of the constitution, the Court will enter upon the
inquiry, whether the laws of New York ... have . .. come into collision with an
act of Congress ....
Should this collision exist, it will be immaterial whether those
laws were passed in virtue of a concurrent power (to regulate commerce ... ) or,
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If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress though
limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power
over commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States,
is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government, having in its constitution the same restrictions on the exercise
of the power as are found in the constitution of the United States.3

The principle that Congress' commerce power reigns supreme when it
acts legislatively has been extended to cases where Congress has not acted.
In this context, the so-called "dormant commerce clause" applies and
the court balances the need for the free flow of interstate goods against
the state's interest in regulation.2
III.

THE STATE REGULATION CASES

The modern dormant commerce clause test for balancing state and25
federal interests is most clearly articulated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.
Where the statute regulates even handedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.
If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one

in virtue of a power to regulate their domestic trade and police.
Id. at 208-10. Professor (later Justice) Frankfurter attributed the confusion in the Marshall opinion
to the Chief Justice's desire to move cautiously in cementing his federalist doctrine.
Marshall's use of the commerce clause greatly furthered the idea that though we
are a federation of states we are also a nation, and gave momentum to the doctrine
that state authority must be subject to such limitations as the Court finds it necessary
to apply for the protection of the national community.
F. FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE 18-19 (W. Mendelson
ed. 1973).
The ambivalence remains over whether the negative implication of the commerce clause is principally
a device that helps to allocate the balance of state and federal power or whether it embodies the
principle of national free trade. Unresolved by Chief Justice Marshall, this debate was perhaps most
classically framed by Justices Frankfurter and Jackson. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying
text. Not surprisingly, this same debate sharply divides the present Court. Compare Reeves, Inc.
v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438 (1980) (5-4 decision) (Blackmun, J.) ("Restraint in this area is also
counseled by considerations of state sovereignty [and] the role of each State 'as guardian and trustee
for its people.'...") with id. at 453 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Commerce Clause long has
been recognized as a limitation on [state] sovereignty, consciously designed to maintain a national
market and defeat economic provincialism.").
23. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 197. In a concurring opinion, Justice Johnson came to the
issue more directly. He would have held that, irrespective of the federal law, the New York license
was invalid as an invasion of the power left exclusively to Congress. "The inferences, to be correctly
drawn, from this whole article, appear to me to be altogether in favour of the exclusive grants to
Congress of power over commerce . . . ." Id. at 236.
24. The Court has stated that it found it necessary to fill in the "great silences" in the Constitution
with respect to the commerce power in order to assure the prosperity of the nation. This author
argues elsewhere that the Constitution is not silent on this point. See DuMars and Tarlock, New
Challenges to State Water Sovereignty, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 331 (1989). The Constitution states
that the Congress can regulate this area. It does not say the Court should overturn state legislation
in this area when Congress has not acted. See also DuMars, Evaluating Congressional Limits on
a State's Severance Tax Equity Interest in its Natural Resources: An Essential Responsibility for
the Supreme Court, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 673 (1982).
25. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
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of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will
of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and
on whether it could
be promoted as well with a lesser impact on
26
interstate activities.

Pre-Pike decisions often failed to formulate a test, and post-Pike decisions
invariably begin their analyses with the Pike formulation. Each of the
commerce clause regulation cases in which the Supreme Court used a
balancing approach can be explained by some or all of the components
of the Pike test: (1) evenhandedness; (2) legitimacy of the local public
interest; (3) burden imposed on
commerce in relation to local benefit;
27
and (4) least intrusive means.
A.

Evenhandedness
The evenhandedness component of the Pike test focuses on whether

the legislation discriminates against interstate commerce. 21 While the cases

do not require absolute equality of treatment of interstate and intrastate
commerce, if the Court finds discrimination 29 it will scrutinize the state
legislation more closely and require the state to offer greater justification
for the statute.30 Indeed, in cases that involve facial discrimination similar

26. Id. at 142 (citation omitted). Pike invalidated a state statute that required Arizona cantaloupes
to be packed in the state. The Court suggested, however, that state regulations that affect public
health or safety might be subjected to a lesser standard of scrutiny. Id. at 143-44.
27. Most recently, the Court has restated the Pike test as a three-pronged test:
Under [the] general rule, we must inquire (1) whether the challenged statute regulates
evenhandedly with only 'incidental' effects on interstate commerce, or discriminates
against interstate commerce either on its face or in practical effect; (2) whether the
statute serves a legitimate local purpose; and if so, (3) whether alternative means
could promote this local purpose as well without discriminating against interstate
commerce.
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
28. Although Pike states the test for discrimination separately from that for burden, the two
tests often employ the same balancing approach. This approach analyzes the state objective, the
purpose behind that objective, and the means chosen to achieve the particular end. For a recent
articulation of the discrimination and burden components of Pike as a single test, see supra note
27.
29. Theoretically, a finding of discrimination against interstate commerce may be overcome by
the absence of less restrictive means to protect a legitimate state interest, but no decision fully
applies this analysis. In fact, a finding of discrimination usually sounds the death knell of a state
statute challenged on commerce clause grounds. When the Court upholds a statute, it often resorts
to formalistic tests in order to avoid pronouncing the statute discriminatory. See, e.g., Exxon' Corp.
v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (Maryland's prohibition against oil producers or refiners
operating retail service stations burdened commerce only incidentally; therefore, it was not discriminatory.).
30. The evenhandedness requirement of Pike parallels the nondiscrimination requirement of the
privileges and immunities clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2. The privileges and immunities clause
ensures to citizens of each state the same rights of state citizenship held by citizens of any other
state into which they venture. It prohibits a state from discriminating against nonresidents when
"there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens
of other States." Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948). See also Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437
U.S. 518 (1978). The Court has allowed preferential treatment of residents over nonresidents only
when such treatment is supported by a valid reason that bears a close relationship to the degree
of discrimination. One example of a legitimate reason for preferential treatment is the protection
of wildlife. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
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to a trade barrier,3" if the state itself is not involved as a "market
participant," the lack of evenhandedness triggers an almost per se rule
of invalidity.3 2 A facially discriminatory statute regulating private activity
that encourages retaliation by sister states 33 or requires action by a sister
state to make its application evenhanded 4 will also receive close scrutiny.
Even when the statute is evenhanded on its face, the Court will examine
the practical effect of the statutory scheme to determine whether it is
discriminatory in operation. When the effect is clearly discriminatory and
without substantial justification, the statute will fall.3
Legitimacy of the Local Public Interest
As a legacy of the old distinction between "police power" and "regulation of commerce," ' 36 the modern cases focus on the nature of the
protected local interest. To the extent that these cases maintain the old7
distinction, they can be viewed as presenting a hierarchy of local interests.1
The more legitimate the local interest, the less judicial scrutiny the Court
seems to require.
At the bottom of the hierarchy are regulatory statutes which discriminate
B.

against out-of-state sellers of products. 38 If the purpose3

9

or predominant

effect 4°

of a regulation is to protect local markets from interstate competition, the regulation is clearly suspect. Somewhat higher in the hierarchy
is a state's interest in the safety of its citizens. In the train and truck
regulation cases, the Court gave safety regulations a strong presumption
of validity when they conflicted with the commerce clause.4 1 At the top
of the hierarchy, state regulation of public health receives great deference
from the Court, second only to the circumstance where the state is acting

31. The difficulty of overcoming clear and demonstrable discrimination is well illustrated by the
milk regulation cases. See, e.g., Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 (1964)
(attempt to reserve local market for local milk held invalid discrimination against interstate commerce);
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S 349 (1951) (invalidating a requirement that milk sold
in the city be pasteurized within five miles of city); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511
(1935) (striking down a prohibition against in-state resale of milk purchased outside the state at
prices below state minimum).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 70-74.
33. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Public Util. Comm'n
v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927).
34. See Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976).
35. E.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (North
Carolina restriction on the labeling of apples shipped into state discriminated against the interstate
sale of Washington apples).
Although one might also expect that a law discriminatory on its face but evenhanded in its
operation will pass constitutional muster, Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979), suggests that
this is not the case. "Such facial discrimination by itself may be a fatal defect, regardless of the
State's purpose ...." Id.at 337.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 44-47.
37. See generally L. TamE, supra note 6, §§ 6-6 to -8, 6-12.
38. But see infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935); Foster-Fountain Packing Co.
v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
40. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
41. See Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 393 U.S. 129 (1968);
South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
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as a market participant. 42 The quarantine cases, in which the Court upheld
statutes prohibiting the importation of diseased cattle or decayed or
noxious food, 43 are the clearest example of the Court's deference to state
health regulations despite direct and substantial impacts on commerce."
As the interest protected by the regulation moves from the economic
sphere toward public safety and health, it becomes more likely that the
statute will withstand commerce clause attack. Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice5 establishes, however, that the mere recitation of
a health or safety purpose will not suffice; the regulation must actually

further the interest asserted. In that case, the Court struck down a stateimposed truck length limitation because the state failed to produce evidence

to counter the plaintiff's massive evidence that the law did not contribute
to highway safety."6
C.

Burden on Commerce in Relation to Local Benefit
The third component of the Pike test asks whether "the burden imposed
on . . . commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local

benefits. '47 This balancing of state and federal interests has been a
constant theme in commerce clause adjudication.48 For example, in Bibb
v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. 49 the Court used a balancing approach to
strike down an Illinois requirement that trucks have contour mudguards.
Because contour mudguards were not measurably safer than the straight
ones allowed in forty-five other states, the showing of added50 safety was

insufficient to outweigh the burden on interstate commerce.

42. See infra notes 77-98 and accompanying text.
43. Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933) (unhealthy cattle); Price v. Illinois, 238 U.S. 446
(1915) (food preservative); Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251 (1908) (unhealthy cattle); Crossman v.
Lurman, 192 U.S. 189 (1904) (adulterated foods).
44. Although these cases have been rationalized on the theory that the prohibited products were
"not proper subjects of commerce," Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 525 (1935),
they are more fairly understood as balancing cases in which the states' interest in prohibiting noxious
products reasonably outweighed the interference with commerce. L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 28 n.43
(Supp. 1979).
45. 434 U.S. 429 (1978).
46. The Court clearly understood that safety, like other legitimate state interests, must be weighed
against interference with interstate commerce. Id. at 443. It has been suggested, however, that if
safety justifications are supported by the factual record, "the Court will not second-guess legislative
judgment about their importance in comparison with related burdens on interstate commerce." Id.
at 449 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
47. 397 U.S. at 142. Pike seems to suggest that the balancing of burden and local benefit will
take place only if the statute's "effects on interstate commerce are ... incidental." Id. This reversion
to the old direct-versus-indirect formula plays little part in modern commerce clause analysis. As
a practical matter, statutes found to withstand the Pike balancing test are also found to have an
incidental effect on commerce. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 126
(1978). Statutes that fail the test are found to have a substantial or direct effect on commerce.
See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington State 'Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
48. L. TRIBE, supra note 6, § 6-12, at 341.
49. 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
50. The burden included the cost of installing the contour mudguards ($30 or more per vehicle)
as well as the delay caused by changing mudguards. Id. at 525, 527.
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D. Least Intrusive Means
Even if a particular regulation furthers a legitimate local purpose, the
Pike test will not permit it to burden commerce when the purpose "could
be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.'", This
least-intrusive-means requirement traditionally has been applied to state
regulations that serve a legitimate state purpose but are discriminatory
on their face or in effect. 2 Even the most compelling and legitimate
local purpose will not save a discriminatory regulation unless there are
no "reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives" available that are "adequate to conserve" the local interest. 3 Thus, the least-intrusive-means
test applies a rigid bottom line to an otherwise flexible standard.
In Hughes v. Oklahoma5 4 an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the interstate
sale of Oklahoma minnows was challenged on commerce clause grounds."
After finding that the law facially discriminated against interstate commerce, 6 the Court unequivocally stated: "At a minimum such facial
discrimination invokes the strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate
local purpose and of the absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives." '5 7
The Court's language suggests that the least-intrusive-means requirement
of Pike is, like the strict scrutiny standard found in the equal protection
cases, virtually impossible to overcome.5"

51. 397 U.S. at 142. The Court first clearly articulated a least-intrusive-means test in Dean Milk
Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951). The Pike formula incorporated essentially the
same test.
52. See Hunt, 432 U.S. 333; Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. at 354. In Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441
U.S. 322 (1979), the Court restated this prong of the Pike test expressly in terms of discrimination:
"whether alternative means could promote this local purpose as well without discriminating against
interstate commerce." Id. at 336.
53. Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. at 354.
54. 441 U.S. 322.
55. Hughes expressly overruled Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896), which held that because
the state "owned" the wild game within its borders, the state's control over the game was outside
the scope of the commerce clause. 441 U.S. at 335; see Geer, 161 U.S. at 530-32. By overruling
Geer, Hughes removed the only barrier to commerce clause scrutiny of the Oklahoma statute.
56. "It forbids the transportation of natural minnows out of the State for purposes of sale,
and thus 'overtly blocks the flow of interstate commerce at [the] State's borders."' Hughes, 441
U.S. at 336-37 (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)).
57. Id. at 337. Applying this strict scrutiny, the Court held the statute repugnant to the commerce
clause because "Oklahoma ha[d chosen to 'conserve' its minnows in the way that most overtly
discriminate[d] against interstate commerce." Id. at 338.
58. The strict scrutiny standard of the equal protection cases has been criticized as a resultoriented label that virtually seals the fate of the challenged regulation. Gunther, The Supreme Court,
1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972). "[Tjhere are very few cases which strictly scrutinize
and yet uphold instances of impaired fundamental rights." L. TRIBE, supra note 6, § 16-6, at 1000.
See Matson v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973); Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973).
As recently stated by Justice Blackmun:
I have never been able fully to appreciate just what a 'compelling state interest'
is. If it means 'convincingly controlling,' or 'incapable of being overcome' upon
any balancing process, then, of course, the test merely announces an inevitable
result, and the test is no test at all. And, for me, 'least drastic means' is a slippery
slope and also the signal of the result the Court has chosen to reach. A judge
would be unimaginative indeed if he could not come up with something a little
less 'drastic' or a little less 'restrictive' in almost any situation, and thereby enable
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THE NATURAL RESOURCE CASES

The Supreme Court has characterized certain state regulations as placing
the state "in a position of economic isolation" 9 that effectuates economic
protectionism 6° or tends toward "economic Balkanization." '6 1 The Court
consistently 62 has used this analysis in cases that involve the isolation of
resources from interstate businesses and consumers in
a state's natural
63
states.
sister
In West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co.,6 the Court was confronted with
an Oklahoma statute that in effect prohibited the shipment of natural
gas outside the state. The Court struck down the statute 65 as purposeful
discrimination against interstate commerce." Similarly, when West Virginia
sought to prevent natural gas pipeline companies from shipping natural
gas out of the state until all local needs were met, the Court in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia 7 held that the commerce clause prohibited the
state's "attempt to regulate the interstate business to the advantage of
the local customers."' ' The Court in these early cases did not reject

himself to vote to strike legislation down.
Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 188-89 (1979) (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
59. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935).
60. H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
61. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979). See Friedman, Hardy & Wuliger, Balkanization
of Interstate Energy Markets: New Variations of Sovereign Self-Interest, 30 CASE W. REs. L. Rv.
291 (1980).
62. E.g., Hughes 441 U.S. 322; City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). See
also supra text accompanying notes 18-30.
63. Similarly, the Court has invalidated an attempt by Mississippi to withhold its markets from
producers in a sister state that did not provide reciprocal rights to Mississippi producers. Great
Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976). The Mississippi regulation was invalid because
it invited "'a multiplication of preferential trade areas destructive of the very purpose of the
Commerce Clause."' Id. at 380 (quoting Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356
(1951)). Relying on the free trade concept that underlies the commerce clause, the Court reasoned
that the commerce clause precludes "the threat of economic isolation as a weapon to force sister
states to enter into even a desirable reciprocity agreement." Id. at 379.
64. 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
65. Id. at 262. The Court relied on the logic of State ex rel. Corwin v. Indiana & Ohio Oil,
Gas & Mining Co., 120 Ind. 575, 22 N.E. 778 (1889), an Indiana case that had invalidated a similar
law. The Corwin court had reasoned as follows: (1) when brought to the surface and put in pipes,
natural gas is a "commercial product" that can be transported, bought, and sold; (2) if natural
gas can be kept in state, so can all other commercial products such as corn, wheat, lead, and iron,
which would result in the 'annihilation of interstate commerce'; and (3) therefore, the statute
prohibiting shipment out of state violates the commerce clause. West, 221 U.S. at 256-57 (quoting
Corwin, 120 Ind. at 578, 22 N.E. at 779).
66. West, 221 U.S. at 250.
67. 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
68. Id. at 597-98. "A State is without power to prevent privately owned articles of trade from
being shipped and sold in interstate commerce on the ground that they are required to satisfy local
demands or because they are needed by the people of the State." Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v.
Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10 (1928). In addition to regulations that favor local customers, those whose
purpose or effect is to favor local producers have been invalidated on commerce clause grounds.
E.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); H.P. Hood &
Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1948); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
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conservation of natural resources as a legitimate state end;69 rather, it
precluded regulations that preferred in-state private purchasers over outof-state private purchasers.
This invalidation of state regulatory discrimination appears most clearly
in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey.70 There, the Court invalidated a
New Jersey law that prohibited private landfill operators from making
space available to private out-of-state garbage collectors who sought to
haul out-of-state garbage to the private dumps.7' The Court found the
"evil of protectionism ' 72 in the statute that precluded interstate access
to the private dumps while allowing intrastate access. 7 The Court applied
"a virtually per se rule of invalidity" to this regulation which, on its
face, preferred private in-state haulers
of garbage over private parties
74
hauling garbage from out-of-state.
V.

THE MARKET PARTICIPANT DOCTRINE

The Court has created an exception to the dormant commerce clause
which arises when the state is acting not as a market regulator but as
a participant in the marketplace, either as a seller or as a buyer. Under
the market participant doctrine, a state or state subdivision that acts as
a market participant rather than a market regulator "is not subject to
the restraints of the Commerce Clause." 75 The Court has expressly reserved
the question addressed by this article: whether state operation of a landfill
may fall within the market participant doctrine. 76 This question has,

69. The modern cases, of course, specifically recognize "the States' interests in conservation ...
as legitimate local purposes similar to the States' interests in protecting the health and safety of
their citizens." Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979). Nondiscriminatory regulations aimed
at conservation will therefore survive commerce clause scrutiny. In Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless
Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950), the Supreme Court let stand a state-imposed increase in oil
wellhead prices as a valid measure to discourage the wasting of gas. The Court concluded that
"[i]nsofar as conservation is concerned, the national interest and the interest of producing states
may well tend to coincide." Id. at 188.
70. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
71. Id. at 628.
72. Id. at 626. It is interesting to note that in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980), the
Court declined to define what makes an item a "natural resource." It simply said cement is not
one. "Cement is not a natural resource, like coal, timber, wild game, or minerals. It is the end
product of a complex process whereby a costly physical plant and human labor act on raw materials."
Id.at 443-44 (citations omitted). This distinction was challenged by Justice Powell in dissent.
73. Consequently, the Court found it unnecessary to reach the Pike balancing test. "This dispute
about ultimate legislative purpose need not be resolved, because its resolution would not be relevant
to the constitutional issue to be decided in this case." 437 U.S. at 626.
74. Id. at 624, 628.
75. White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 208 (1983).
Application of the distinction between "market participant" and "market regulator" has, however,
occasioned considerable dispute in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. The author of each of the
three opinions that applied the doctrine-Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976)
(Powell, J.); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (Blackmun, J.); White, 460 U.S. 204
(Rehnquist, J.)-authored a dissent in the next, the pattern being maintained by Justice Rehnquist's
dissent in South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 101 (1984), the
principal case in which application of the doctrine resulted in a conclusion that the state was not
a market participant.
76. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 n.6 (1978).
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however, been addressed by state and lower federal courts with mixed
results .77
In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.," the Supreme Court upheld
Maryland's statutory scheme to rid the state of derelict automobiles, even
though the scheme entailed two types of discrimination: (1) Maryland
paid bounties to in-state scrap auto bulk processors while refusing to
pay bounties to out-of-state processors on the same terms; and (2) Maryland paid bounties only for vehicles formerly titled in Maryland. 79 The
Court held that the statutory scheme was consistent with the commerce
clause because Maryland was participating in the market rather than
regulating it.8° The majority stated, "[n]othing in the purposes animating
the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional
action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor
its own citizens over others.' '81
In Reeves, Inc. v. Stake 8 2 the Court upheld a South Dakota policy
of confining the sale of cement by a state-operated cement plant exclusively
to South Dakota residents to meet their demand during a 'serious cement
shortage." ''8 3 The Court affirmed "[t]he basic distinction drawn in AlexandriaScrap between States as market participants and States as market
regulators," concluding that "South Dakota, as a seller of cement,
unquestionably fits the 'market participant' label." ' 84 Reeves, a Wyoming
corporation that had purchased about 95% of its cement from South
Dakota's state-operated plant for over twenty years, was forced to cut
production by over 75% as a result of the policy. 8
In White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc.,86
the Court held that an executive order of the Mayor of Boston, which
77. Government ownership was recognized as market participation not subject to commerce clause
limitations in: Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County, 678 F. Supp. 1116 (M.D. Md.),
aff'd, 883 F.2d 245 (3rd Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1127 (1990); Lafrancois v. Rhode Island,
669 F. Supp. 1204 (D.R.I. 1987); Evergreen Waste Sys. v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 643 F. Supp.
127 (D. Or. 1986), aff'd, 820 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1987); Harvey & Harvey v. Delaware Solid Waste
Authority, 600 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Del. 1985); Shayne Bros. v. District of Columbia, 592 F. Supp.
1128 (D.D.C. 1984); County Comm'rs of Charles County v. Stevens, 473 A.2d 12, 299 Md. 203
(1984). When the state acts to regulate a market where it is not a participant, or acts to regulate
beyond the extent of its own participation, courts apply commerce clause standards. See J. Filiberto
Sanitation v. State of N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 857 F.2d 913 (3rd Cir. 1988); Washington
State Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 913 (1983); Industrial Maintenance Service, Inc. v. Moore, 677 F. Supp. 436 (S.D. W.
Va. 1987); Al Turi Landfill v. Town of Goshen, 556 F. Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 697 F.2d
287 (2nd Cir. 1982); Shayne Bros., Inc. v. Prince George's County, 556 F. Supp. 182 (D. Md.
1983).
78. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
79. Id. at 797, 801.
80. Id. at 809-10.
81. Id. at 810 (footnotes omitted). The best legal opinion discussing the high court's views in
this area is Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County, Pa., 883 F.2d 245 (3rd Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1127 (1990). Much of the discussion here simply paraphrases Judge Becker's
views as expressed in that opinion.
82. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
83. Id. at 432.
84. Id. at 436, 440.
85. Id. at 433, 452 n.4.
86. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
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required all construction projects funded in whole or in part either by
city funds or city-administered federal funds to be performed by a work
force of at least 50°7o city residents, was "well within the scope of
Alexandria Scrap and Reeves. "87 Justice Blackmun dissented, arguing that
the city "ha[d] imposed as a condition of obtaining a public construction
contract the requirement that private firms hire only Boston residents
for 50o of specified jobs. ' 88 Thus, Boston was regulating the hiring
practices of private employers. 9 The majority agreed with Justice Blackmun that for an action to fall within the market participant doctrine,
there must be "limits on a state or local government's ability to impose
restrictions that reach beyond the immediate parties with which the
government transacts business. "' 9 The Court did not define those limits
with precision because "[iun this case . . . [e]veryone affected by the
order is, in a substantial if informal sense, 'working for the city."' 9'
The limits on the extension of the market-participant doctrine were
reached in South-Central Timber Developments, Inc. v. Wunnicke. 92 In
Wunnicke, a plurality struck down Alaska's requirement that timber taken
from state lands be processed in-state prior to export. The plurality held
that
[t]he limit of the market-participant doctrine must be that it allows
a State to impose burdens on commerce within the market in which
it is a participant, but [does not] allow [it] to ... impose conditions,
whether by statute, regulation, or contract, that have
a substantial
93
regulatory effect outside of that particular market.
The Alaska policy crossed the line distinguishing participation from regulation because the conditions it attached to its timber sales amounted
to "downstream regulation of the timber-processing market in which it
is not a participant."' '
A.

The Market ParticipantDoctrine and Natural Resources
A central question not yet answered by the court is whether the marketparticipant doctrine will be applied with full force to allocation of natural
resources. Unlike a manufactured product or the provision of services,
a state cannot manufacture a natural resource. While it may seem "just"
for South Dakota to favor its citizens in the sale of manufactured cement
from a state-owned cement plant, it may not seem just for a state to
favor its own citizens when selling a rare mineral if the state happens
to be endowed with the bulk of the nation's supply of this rare mineral
and other states are dependent upon it.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 211 n.7, 205 n.1.
Id.at 217.
Id.
Id. at 211.
Id. at 211 n.7.
467 U.S. 82 (1984).
Id. at 97.
Id. at 99.
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The Supreme Court has only alluded to this issue. In Reeves, the Court
noted that
[clement is not a natural resource, like coal, timber, wild game, or
minerals. It is the end product of a complex process whereby a costly
physical plant and human labor act on raw materials. South Dakota
has not sought to limit access to the State's limestone or other materials
used to make cement .... Moreover, petitioner has not suggested
that South Dakota possesses unique access to the materials needed
to produce cement. Whatever limits might exist on a State's ability
to invoke the Alexandria Scrap exemption to hoard resources which
by happenstance are found there, those limits do not apply here. 95
Similarly, in Sporhase v. Nebraska,9 a case which struck down a
Nebraska statute that restricted out-of-state sales of groundwater, the
Court cited Reeves, concluding that "given [Nebraska's water] conservation efforts, the continuing availability of groundwater in Nebraska is
not simply happenstance; the natural resource has some indicia of a good
publicly produced and owned in which a State may favor its own citizens
The Court went on to describe, in dictum, the
in times of shortage."
circumstances under which Nebraska might reserve its groundwater solely
for in-state uses. In Wunnicke, the Court noted that an "element[ ] ...
not preserit in Reeves" but present in the Alaska case was the "involve[ment]" of a "natural resource.''98
In the Third Circuit case of Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming
County, Pennsylvania," Judge Becker was not persuaded that the market
participant doctrine does not apply to natural resources. He pointed out
that the Court in Alexandria Scrap stated clearly that .'[n]othing inthe
purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absences
of congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising
The opinion in Reeves
the right to favor its own citizens over others. ''100
quotes this same language, emphasizing its "unmistakably broad terms." 0
The Market ParticipantDoctrine and State Sales of Landfill
Space
Judge Becker's opinion in Swin Resource Systems, Inc. is persuasive
in concluding that irrespective of whether the market participant doctrine
applies to natural resources, landfill space is not a naturally occurring
B.

95. 447 U.S. at 443-44 (emphasis added; citations and footnotes omitted).
96. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
97. Id. at 957 (emphasis added).
98. 467 U.S. at 96; cf. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 338 n.6
(1982) (characterizing Reeves as establishing that "a state may confine to its residents the sale of
products it produces" and refusing to characterize as market participation New Hampshire's efforts
to limit out-of-state sale of hydro-electric power generated by a privately owned power company
from a river assertedly owned by the state).
99. 883 F.2d 245 (3rd Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1127 (1990).
100. Id. at 249 (quoting Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976) (footnotes
omitted)).
101. 447 U.S. at 436.
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resource which the state is obligated to share with the entire nation. He
concluded:
This [landfill space] is not a case in which a state has hoarded a
resource like coal or oil that is geologically peculiar to that state
(although even with respect to such a natural resource, the Supreme
Court has permitted states to exploit their monopoly position by
exporting tax burdens to other states through facially neutral tax
statutes ... ). Nor is this a case in which a state has used its ownership
of land to discriminate against the transportation of goods in interstate
commerce. The[] right-of-way or transportation cases raise a discrete
set of concerns, as open 'channels of commerce ...are essential to
the market itself' because they are 'essential to [an outsider's] ability
to do business in the state.'0 2
Judge Becker went on to hold that the market participant doctrine
should be applied with full force to landfill space. 03 First, he reasoned
that construction of a landfill to meet modern ecological requirements
requires expense on the part of the state in the same way that construction
of a cement plant involves expense.1l 4 Second, the fact that a landfill is
located on land does not make the landfill a natural resource, as virtually
all businesses are located on land.'05 Third, the state expends money to
acquire the land on which the landfill is located, just as South Dakota
spent money in Reeves to build the cement plant.1 6 Fourth, unlike the
extraction of resources such as coal, which generates jobs and resource
taxes, dumps are noxious uses put in place as a sacrifice of the people
in the area. 10 Fifth, the land space is not there by "happenstance."
While coal resources are providentially located in a particular state,
landfills are permitted as a result of political choice.108 Finally, the scarcity
of landfill space in the garbage-producing state may be a politically
created shortage because the state of exportation has elected not to locate
dumps within the state and simply prefers to export the waste.1 9 As
stated by Judge Becker, "[n]either the sacrifice nor the political character
of much of the shortage of land available for landfill constructions can
be ignored.""' 0
While, as discussed above, the members of the Supreme Court are
plainly not always in agreement as to the rationale behind the market
participant doctrine, two fundamental bases for the doctrine have emerged.
First, state government reflects the will of the people of a state who are
exercising their private choices collectively in the form of a public trust.
The people of a state voluntarily submit themselves to the taxing process

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 254 (3rd Cir. 1989).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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in hopes that their collective wealth will be used to better their collective
self interest. State tax monies are collected, pooled, and spent on projects
that serve the needs of the state's citizens. As necessary, state monies
are spent on state roads, schools, fire and police protection, water systems,
universities, parks, and other accoutrements of a civilized society. In
addition, state monies are spent on research in the area of environmental
quality and are used to subsidize industries that conform to environmental
quality standards established by the state. Monies not spent are placed
in financial institutions within the state. No one seriously argues that
when a state legislature decides in which savings and loan institution it
will place its money, it must advertise nationally for the best price. It
may select only institutions within the state. Nor does anyone seriously
argue that a state is obligated to extend its highway construction work
across the state line into another state or that state scholarships must
be given to citizens from other states. Thus, one basis for the market
participant doctrine is the Court's view that the state qua state is simply
serving its constituents, as it is obligated to do, when it builds a landfill
exclusively for its citizens, builds a cement plant as in Reeves, or when
it purchases junk car hulks as in Alexandria Scrap. As Justice Black
stated in Reeves, the market participant doctrine enables "the people
[acting through their local government] to determine as conditions demand
... what services and the functions the public welfare requires. '
A second market participant rationale is based on the basic freedom
of choice that any proprietor may exercise in deciding from whom it
wishes to purchase or to whom it wishes to sell. For example, suppose
a non-profit corporation purchased land in an area such as Texas and
built a model city the size of Rhode Island. No one would seriously
argue that, absent restrictions on individual liberties or privileges and
immunities of national citizenship, this development would be constrained
in deciding to whom it sold lots. More specifically, no one would seriously
argue that this private development must accept out-of-state garbage at
its private dump. Thus, the market participant doctrine is also based in
part on the fundamental right in a free market economy to exercise
proprietary choice. Why should the state, as a proprietor, be foreclosed
from making the same market choices available to the private sector as
long as a specific guarantee of the Constitution is not violated?
The dissenting judge in Swin Resource Systems, Inc. argued that the
12E
rationale of Garciav. San Antonio Metropolitan TransportationAuthority
has sub silentio overruled the market participant doctrine because the
true safeguards against abuses under the commerce clause lie not in
judicially imposed limits on the clause, but in the procedural political
safeguards present in our federal system of government. These safeguards
include state representation in the Senate, the electoral college, and the

111. 447 U.S. 429, 438 n.ll (1980).
112. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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doctrine of separation of powers, all of which exist to preclude abuses
3
of state sovereignty."
The argument that Garcia requires states to go to Congress to obtain
the right to preclude an interstate garbage carrier from hauling trash to
a state-created dump turns the commerce clause on its head. As discussed
above, the Supreme Court, in its commerce clause decisions, stepped into
what it perceived as a regulatory void to ensure that goods can move
in interstate commerce and to prevent balkanization by states. The Court
stated that it moved into this area to fill in the "great silences" contained
in the commerce clause itself." 4 A review of the cases discussed above
illustrates that the commerce clause has been neither silent nor dormant.
The commerce clause is not silent because it states expressly that the
Congress (not the Court) has the power to regulate interstate commerce.
The commerce clause is not dormant because, even when Congress has
not acted, the Court has consistently used the clause to strike down state
laws which the Court considers violative of broadly shaped, judicially
fashioned prohibitions against trade restraint or violative of principles
of antitrust laws loosely applied to the states.
Perhaps the most euphoric moment for the Court in the exercise of
the commerce clause came when Justice Jackson in Hood & Sons v.
DuMond"5 baldly stated that the Court itself had ensured the prosperity
of the nation by its interpretations of the commerce clause. He stated
that "even more than by interpretation of its written word, this court
has advanced the solidarity and prosperity of this nation by the meaning
it has given to these great silences of the Constitution.""16
Whatever prosperity the Court may have brought to the nation through
its interpretations of the commerce clause-an issue explored below in
the discussion of whether a state-owned dump creates a monopolysurely the Court never anticipated that it was rewriting the commerce
clause to provide that states can place no regulations on commerce unless
authorized to do so by the Congress. It is certainly true that a state law
establishing a state-owned landfill may be preempted by a federal law
regulating the same area. It hardly follows from this rule, however, that
a state must go to Congress to obtain a federal law to allow it to operate
a state facility exclusively for its citizens. It is patently absurd to suggest
that the Court in Garcia was somehow suggesting that all state-operated
facilities impacting commerce are unconstitutional until authorized by
Congress. It is likewise absurd from a practical standpoint to suggest
that an individual state or county could routinely muster the political
clout to get congressional approval for all public welfare activities that
might impact on commerce.
This complete sub silentio federal preemption view is inconsistent with
the plain language of the Court. "Nothing in the purposes animating
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the Commerce Clause forbids a State, in the absence of congressional
action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor
its own citizens over others.1" 7 As the Court stated succinctly in Reeves,
"the competing considerations in cases involving state proprietary actions
often will be subtle, complex, politically charged, and difficult to assess
under traditional Commerce Clause analysis."",, Given these factors,
Alexandria Scrap wisely recognized that, as a rule, the adjustment of
interests in this context is a task better suited for Congress than the
Court." 9 This rule means that if state market participation is bad for
the federal union, the activity should be preempted by the Congress. It
does not mean that a state must go to Congress to get authorization for
state market participation.
The dissenting judge in Swin Resource Systems, Inc. also argued that
South Central Timber foreclosed state market participation ir6 landfills
because it prohibited states from regulating activities "downstream" by
placing discriminatory conditions on private entities that buy from the
state. 12 He concluded that excluding out-of-state wastes imposes conditions
"upstream" of the landfill activity; therefore, such state regulation is
also precluded.' 2 ' The unconstitutional "upstream condition" is that the
22
waste must come from within the state to be accepted at the landfill.
This argument misses the point of South Central Timber. The State
of Alaska was using conditions on sales of timber to encourage purchasers
to process logs in Alaska, thereby favoring in-state processors over outof-state processors. The county landfill in Swin Resource Systems, Inc.
was not encouraging in-state hauling of garbage or encouraging in-state
citizens to produce more garbage; it was simply, as in Alexandria Scrap,
allocating its wealth to solve the problem of refuse generated in-state.
Reservation of State Landfill Space Exclusively for State Citizens
and Economic Efficiency
The political and economic arguments against the state acting as market
participant and operating a landfill solely for its citizens include, inter
alia, that a state should not be involved in waste management because
waste management is more efficiently left to the private sector. Second,
if the state is involved, it is unfair for the state to exercise the choice
to have waste management become an exclusive function of the state.
Third, if solid waste disposal is an exclusive function of the state, waste
facilities must be open to waste from other states or the following negative
results will occur:
C.
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1. There will be retaliation from sister states who will refuse to
accept garbage from the receiving state until all states are forced
to dispose of their own refuse in their own state;
2. State dumps will be inefficient from an economic perspective
because a state does not operate on the same profit motives as
the private sector. Furthermore, state operators will create unfair
competition because states will subsidize their own dumping operations;
3. From a national perspective, there will be economic inefficiency
because states may cordon off areas proximate to industry and
artificially raise transportation costs;
4. State waste management will constitute resource hoarding and, in
effect, allow states to control markets and achieve results similar
to those prohibited by anti-trust laws; and
5. The prices of goods will increase due to higher priced refuse
disposal costs because of the "artificial" limitations on available
landfill space. Furthermore, there will be an increase in illegal
dumping.
The argument that private dump operators may be more efficient than
state dump operators may be correct in terms of cost to the consumer
because the private dump operator is operating on a profit motive. When
one is concerned about the costly environmental protection measures
required by the state, however, the private operator may be more likely
to cut corners to maximize profits. The state, on the other hand, gains
nothing by non-compliance with environmental regulation and externality
costs to society as a whole may be reduced.
If there are good "economic" efficiency reasons to have the private
sector involved in the waste business, they can be satisfied by allowing
private contractors to compete for the contracts to haul waste and to
construct and operate the facilities. Such contracts will not alter the fact
that the state is the owner of the facilities, having purchased the land
and paid for the landfill's construction.
As to the overall "unfairness" arguments, state disposal of waste has
been a traditional function of government for centuries. If the state has
the police power to be the exclusive seller of liquor and the controller
of dangerous substances, it likewise has the police power exclusively to
dispose of solid wastes in the public interest.
As to the alleged negative economic efficiency results from denying
out-of-state wastes access to state-owned dumps, the following responses
may be appropriate. Regarding possible retaliation from sister states, it
is not at all clear that states will respond by closing their own dumps.
If states do respond in this manner, such a closure will not necessarily
cause problems. For example, if a state constructs its own waste facilities
for its own citizens, it will not need to send its wastes elsewhere and
seek access to dumps in a sister state. Thus, a retaliatory law in another
state will not harm the state being denied access. Moreover, if the
retaliating state constructs the dump with its own funds, there is no
reason to allow access to wastes from another state, nor will there be
demand from other states because they will be handling their own wastes.
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In addition, the specter of all states denying access to other states'
garbage in order to protect their environment is hardly what history has
taught us about competition between the states. Historically, states have
been willing to exploit their environments in order to obtain jobs and
wealth for their citizens. A good example is the development of coal
fields in Appalachia without adequate reclamation procedures. Even worse,
some states have even exploited their children by allowing them to work
at young ages and at low wages to attract industry. Congress has been
forced to pass laws prohibiting states from squandering their resources,
not laws ensuring that they are made available. 23 Thus, it is extremely
unlikely that all states will close their doors to out-of-state wastes for
environmental protection reasons.
Finally, if sufficient financial incentives are made available, some states
will be willing to accept out-of-state waste. If all of the externality costs
associated with environmental protection in waste disposal are paid, states
will accept the wastes. Assuming the worst, if a state cannot find another
state willing to accept its wastes, it can require industry to internalize
the costs of waste management through incineration or other methods
by subsidizing recycling or encouraging production which produces less
waste. This hardly seems like a disastrous result.
The arguments that states should not operate dumps because states do
not operate on a profit motive and that a state dump will provide unfair
subsidized competition also require very little discussion. The market is
filled with numerous entities that do not operate strictly on "for profit"
principles. Nonprofit corporations such as churches and research foundations participate in the market, as do sentimental people who choose
not to sell things because profit has become irrelevant to them. For the
state also to participate without pure "self interest" motives will not
create any gross distortion of the market. Further, one can argue that
when only the state owns landfills, the state is not distorting a market
because it is simply electing not to allow the existence of a market, either
interstate or intrastate. The state is not subsidizing its own competition
in a market; it is simply not allowing a market to develop. In such a
case, the state concludes that the private sector can compete for the right
to construct the dump, to sell land to the state for the dump, to haul
wastes to the dump, and even to operate the dump. The state also
concludes, however, that ownership of dumps is an exclusive function
of the state which is subsidized by the state with resident taxpayer dollars.
From a purely national economic perspective, the argument that it is
economically inefficient to have states set up exclusive disposal sites to
handle only wastes from industry located within the state may have merit.
In a free market, industries will logically locate proximate to markets,
labor supplies, areas with good transportation systems, and raw materials.
Another logical and economically efficient choice is to locate near an

123. Compare United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) with Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).

Winter 1990]

STATE EXCLUSION OF GARBAGE

inexpensive place to dispose of wastes. If an industry is located near the
border of a state that has ample waste disposal area, it may be economically more efficient to move wastes across the state line. One can
also argue, however, from a purely national economic perspective, that
municipal garbage trucks should be forced to cross the state line and
pick up waste from an industry in a nearby state and that the geographically nearest police and fire protection should always be made
available to the most proximate industry, irrespective of state lines. If
it is economically inefficient to withhold access to dumps because of
state lines, it is also economically inefficient to force in-state police, fire,
and garbage service to come from a great distance when closer service
is available from a nearby state.
As inefficient as it may seem, this nation is composed of separate
states. This national federal-state partnership was created when the Founding Fathers drafted a Constitution placing local police power in state
government. Until someone is willing to redraft the Constitution to
eliminate the basic federal-state structure, states will continue to exercise
the constitutional right to refuse to collect garbage from nearby states
and to not extend police and fire protection across state lines. States
will also likely attempt to refuse to accept out-of-state garbage, even
though it may be economically inefficient from a national perspective
for them to exercise this choice. Interstate compacts may be appropriate
to achieve greater economic efficiency, but this is a matter of choice by
the states.
The argument that not allowing interstate access to waste disposal sites
constitutes resource hoarding and a state monopoly in violation of antitrust
principles is also misplaced. First, it is generally a "happenstance" event
when one discovers oil in his or her backyard. It is fortuitous that the
natural resource exists there because nature, not man, put it there. The
resource exists as a source of future revenues for the state and as fuel
for the nation as a whole, not as a result of a state's investment of its
revenues.
Development of a waste disposal site is not a happenstance event that
gives rise to cries of "Eureka!" Rather, waste disposal sites are an
obnoxious but necessary by-product of growth and industrial development.
As described above, these sites are costly to develop and may potentially
contaminate the air and the groundwater and require extensive monitoring.
Furthermore, the scarcity of dump sites in a state that produces the waste
may be a reflection of political and economic choice. Industry may not
be able to dispose of waste in the state where it is produced either
because it is too costly, given state regulations, or because it is too much
trouble. One cannot create a coal deposit, but a state can build a furnace
to incinerate garbage, start a recycling program, prohibit the sale of
nonreturnable bottles, or pay a bounty for aluminum cans. If a state
elects not to do these things, it may be creating its own waste disposal
scarcity.
As to the state acting as a monopolist, none of the accoutrements of
monopolistic behavior are present in state management of landfills. First,

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

numerous states have space for landfills, and it is doubtful, if not
impossible, that any one state can control this entire market. If a state
elects not to accept out-of-state waste, this is a political/market choice.
Second, a monopoly would exist only if a group of states conspire to
control the market and intentionally distort it to gain an unfair market
advantage through unfair higher prices for disposal. The decision not to
accept out-of-state wastes is the antithesis of unfair monopoly. The state
is declining revenues by exercising a political choice. It is not raising the
price of waste disposal space to gain an unfair market advantage; it is
losing money. Further, proving a monopoly does exist as a result of one
state's activities will be virtually impossible. When Montana placed a
thirty percent severance tax on coal, ninety percent of which was shipped
out-of-state, thereby indirectly collecting tax revenues from out-of-state
users of coal, the Supreme Court declined to find a monopoly by the
State of Montana. The Supreme Court concluded:
The threshold questions whether a state enjoys a "monopoly"
position and whether the tax burden is shifted out of state, rather
than borne by in-state producers and consumers, would require complex factual inquiries about such issues as elasticity of demand for
the product and alternate sources of supply .... It has been suggested
that 'the formidable evidentiary difficulties in appraising the geographical distribution of industry, with a view toward determining a
state's monopolistic position might make the Court's inquiry futile." 2 4
Finally, in the unlikely event a state is considered to be exercising a
monopoly power, Congress can make the state's activities subject to the
anti-trust laws and the legal tools for ferreting out unfair trade practices
can be applied. As stated by Justice White in his concurring opinion in
Commonwealth Edison regarding the Montana tax, "there is particular
' 25
force in the argument that the tax here and now is unconstitutional."'
If Congress considered it, Congress would preempt it, because "surely
the political
Montana and other similarly situated States do not have
26
power to impose their will on the rest of the country."'1
The arguments that a state's refusal to accept out-of-state wastes will
increase costs of waste disposal in some states and that there will be an
increase in illegal dumping may be factually correct in the short run. It
does not follow, however, that an out-of-state ban is ultimately bad for
the nation. Part of the true cost of producing a product or of society's
use of nonrecyclable products is the cost of waste disposal. Assuming,
arguendo, that the options of disposing of wastes in the ocean or in a
sister state are not available, the costs of more expensive methods of
disposal must be passed on to the consumer. One can argue persuasively
that society is better off if disposal costs are paid up-front and if these
costs are borne by the consumer. Simply because wastes have been out
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of sight in the past does not mean that their disposal costs have been
paid. What "out-of-sight" disposal often means is that future generations
will be forced to pay cleanup costs for past consumption. Any action
which causes the present generation of consumers to pay for present
waste disposal costs is a positive one. As to the possibility of illegal
dumping, while dumpers may rebel and dump illegally, it is possible to
curb that rebellion through a combination of education and stiffer penalties for such illegal activities.
VI.

CONCLUSION

By excluding out-of-state waste, a state is simply making a choice that
any market participant may make-the choice not to participate in the
market. Some states elect to allow private lotteries; others do not. Some
states elect to allow gambling as a source of revenue; some do not. Some
states may elect to allow a private waste disposal industry to develop
and accept out-of-state wastes; others may not. The by-products of not
participating in the market are not wild marketplace distortions, as argued
by some; rather, there may be the positive results of increased efficiency
in industry and modification of consumer behavior.
There is a fundamental distinction between state "market participant"
exclusion of interstate garbage and the classic commerce clause case where
the interstate businessman seeks to cross the border to a sister state and
sell his wares. Encouraging the generation of more interstate business
and helping the nation move forward as one national economic unit is
a positive goal that was anticipated by the framers of the Constitution.
In contrast, encouraging the generation of garbage is not something the
national body politic must do to survive. Garbage is a noxious but
inevitable by-product of production and societal growth. State ownership
of waste disposal sites encourages the reduction of garbage and forces
internalization of waste disposal costs so that these costs are paid by
present generations. This is not the creation of trade barriers that destroy
the nation; rather, it is rational environmental protection behavior that
promotes the nation's prosperity.

